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ROUSEY v. ROUSEY: THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA JOINS THE NATIONAL
TREND TOWARDS ABOLITION OF
PARENTAL IMMUNITY
The parental immunity doctrine, once widely accepted by American
courts,' has faced numerous challenges to its vitality in the past few de-
cades.2 The doctrine of parental immunity bars an unemancipated, minor
child from bringing either a negligent or intentional tort action against a
parent.' The harsh effect of this broad prohibition and the widespread criti-
cism provoked by its rationale have prompted many courts to reconsider the
doctrine.4 Initially, courts reacted to the parental immunity doctrine by cre-
ating exceptions to it, thereby imposing liability for specified parental con-
duct.' Gradually, however, courts began to abolish parental immunity
partially or entirely. 6 This movement has continued to the extent that, to-
day, the continued viability of the doctrine is questionable.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently abolished the doc-
trine of parental immunity in Rousey v. Rousey. 7 This decision marked the
District of Columbia's alignment with the growing number of jurisdictions
which have partially or entirely abrogated the doctrine. The Rousey case
1. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM
L. REV. 489, 494 (1982). The courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, North Dakota, South Da-
kota, Utah, and Vermont have never affirmatively adopted parental immunity. Id. at 494 n.39.
2. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en
banc); Gelbman v. Geibman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Goller
v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
3. Hollister, supra note 1, at 489.
4. See generally Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982) (parental immunity abridged
only where negligent parent has liability insurance and policy limits curtail extent of liability);
Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962) (no parental immunity where child
sues deceased parent's estate); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971) (parent
held liable for injury to child occurring during conduct of purely business activities; not famil-
ial ones).
5. See cases cited supra note 4.
6. See Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d
914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122
N.W.2d 193 (1963). Although these cases are generally cited for the proposition that they
have completely abrogated parental immunity, all three jurisdictions recognize that certain
parental acts will remain privileged and, thus, are immune from liability. Streenz, 106 Ariz. at
89, 471 P.2d at 285; Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292; Goller, 20
Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
7. 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987) (en banc).
Catholic University Law Review
involved a minor child who brought a tort action against her mother, alleg-
ing that the mother's negligence caused an automobile accident in which the
child sustained injuries.8 The trial court granted the mother's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the doctrine of parental immunity
barred the child's suit.9 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that parents will be liable to their minor children for injuries
sustained in automobile accidents caused by parental negligence, provided
that the negligent parent carries liability insurance. 1
One year later, the court of appeals reheard the case en banc and extended
its previously narrow holding to announce a general rejection of the doctrine
of parental immunity in all cases of parental negligence.1 1 The court recog-
nized, however, that certain parental acts would remain privileged due to the
traditional nature of the parent-child relationship and, therefore, were ex-
empt from this general rule.12
Judges Nebeker and Belson each wrote separate dissenting opinions.
1 3
Judge Nebeker criticized the majority's reliance upon the prevalence of lia-
bility insurance as a significant factor in its decision to abolish parental im-
munity and predicted that abolition would create dissension and strife
among family members. 4 Judge Belson, on the other hand, characterized
the majority's opinion as an unjustified departure from an established judi-
cial doctrine and suggested that the issue of parental immunity would be
more appropriately resolved by the legislature. 5
This Note will explore the history of the parental immunity doctrine and
briefly examine the various jurisdictional approaches to its abolition or re-
tention. It will then discuss the opinion in Rousey v. Rousey in light of the'
prior law in the District of Columbia, and analyze the legal and factual sup-
port for the court of appeal's present position. Finally, this Note will con-
clude by suggesting that the District of Columbia adopt a "reasonable
person" standard for determining privileged parental conduct rather than
proceed on an unguided case-by-case basis.
8. Id. at 416.
9. Id.
10. Rousey v. Rousey, 499 A.2d 1199, 1202 (D.C. 1985), rev'd en banc, 528 A.2d 416
(D.C. 1987).
11. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 416.
12. Id. at 421 n.9.
13. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text (discussion of dissenting opinions).
14. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 421 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 424 (Belson, J., dissenting).
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I. PARENTAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE: A LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
JUDICIAL CREATION
A. Origin of the Parental Immunity Doctrine
Common law did not expressly recognize the legal doctrine of parental
immunity.16 Unlike its conception of husband and wife as a single legal en-
tity, common law treated parent and child as separate legal entities.17 A
child could both own property and maintain actions based upon his property
rights.18 He could also maintain an action in tort to recover damages and be
held liable as an individual for any tortious injuries he caused to others.19
Until 1891, however, no child ever attempted to recover for injuries inflicted
tortiously by a parent. This reluctance to bring suit can most likely be at-
tributed to the "almost unbridled parental authority" nineteenth century
parents enjoyed.2°
The first attempt by a child to recover personal injury damages from a
parent arose in Hewellette v. George. 2 In Hewellette, a minor child sued her
mother for actual and compensatory damages after her mother falsely im-
prisoned her in a mental institution for eleven days.22 Although the daugh-
16. The case of Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) is generally recog-
nized by commentators as the first case to deny recovery to a minor on the ground that a
parent enjoys immunity from any personal injury action brought by his or her child. See, e.g.,
Hollister, supra note 1, at 493-94; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43
HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1063 (1930). It has been noted that Canada and Scotland have allowed
personal injury actions against parents and that English law does not prohibit such actions.
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 122, at 904 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. PROSSER & R. KEETON].
17. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 16, at 904-05.
18. Id. at 904; see also 1 J. SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, AND Do-
MESTIC RELATIONS § 691, at 719 (6th ed. 1921). However, an unemancipated child did not
have full contractual capacity. See McCurdy, supra note 16, at 1057.
19. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 16, at 904. In litigation, common law required
that an unemancipated child be represented by a "next friend." 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0.
GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.11, at 571 (2d ed. 1986).
20. Hollister, supra note 1, at 493. Nineteenth century authorities held conflicting and
somewhat vague views regarding the possibility that a parent may be held liable to its child for
personal injuries. McCurdy, supra note 16, at 1059-63. The principle that a parent deserves
substantial discretion over the control and discipline of its child received general recognition.
Moreover, it was suggested by some that criminal prosecution or denial of custody would
provide a more appropriate remedy for unreasonably harsh parental chastisement. Id.; see also
I J. SCHOULER, supra note 18, § 691, at 717-18. Criminal prosecution and conviction of par-
ents for child abuse or mistreatment was rare, however, and direct state intervention by sepa-
rating the child from its parents was utilized almost exclusively in poverty cases. Hollister,
supra note 1, at 492-93.
21. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The plaintiff's name in this case is also spelled "Hew-
lett" by many courts and critics. The spelling in the Southern Reporter, however, is
"Hewellette."
22. 68 Miss. at 704, 9 So. at 887.
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ter prevailed at trial, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the jury
verdict on appeal.2 3 The court held that the public policy of promoting
peace and unity among family members barred a minor from bringing a per-
sonal injury action against his or her parent "so long as the parent is under
obligation to care for, guide, and control" the child.24
Subsequent to Hewellette's first pronunciation of a doctrine of parental
immunity, all but eight states adopted the doctrine of parental immunity
judicially.25 Although most courts accepted the reasoning advanced by
Hewellette, that parental immunity furthered societal interests in family
unity and harmony, courts additionally offered numerous other rationales to
support the doctrine.
2 6
Many courts reasoned that permitting children to sue their parents would
undermine parents' traditional authority to discipline and control their chil-
dren.27 Courts maintained that parents have a duty to discipline and sup-
port their children, and considered children to have a reciprocal duty to
obey and serve their parents.28 They hypothesized that children would lose
respect and deference for their parents, in derogation of their filial duties, if
they were aware of their parents' vulnerability to suit for tortious conduct.29
In Roller v. Roller,3 o the Supreme Court of Washington buttressed its ac-
23. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
24. Id., 9 So. at 887. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied the plaintiff daughter relief
despite the fact of the daughter's marriage. Id., 9 So. at 887. The plaintiff and her husband
had separated at the time of the plaintiff's imprisonment, however, and the court deemed the
plaintiff's resumption of residence at her mother's home to resurrect the parent-child relation-
ship although the court actually was uncertain as to whether or not the plaintiff had returned
to her mother's home to live. Id., 9 So. at 887. The court did acknowledge the possibility that
marriage could dissolve the obligations created by the parent-child relationship and thus allow
the maintenance of a personal injury suit by a minor child. Id., 9 So. at 887.
25. For a list of the eight states which failed to judicially adopt parental immunity, see
Hollister, supra note 1, at 494 n.39.
26. See generally McCurdy, supra note 16, at 1072-77 (expositing the rationales advanced
by different jurisdictions to support their adoption of parent-child immunity). For an exten-
sive critique of the merits of these rationales, see Hollister, supra note 1, at 496-508.
27. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 429, 289 P.2d 218, 223-24 (1955) (a par-
ent's right to discipline his or her child constitutes the "basic policy" behind parental immu-
nity); Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 256, 130 S.E.2d 568, 569 (1963) (public policy behind
parental immunity is to prevent deterioration of family harmony and parental discipline); Mc-
Kelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (first opinion to set out the parental
discipline rationale in a case where a minor child was subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment by her stepmother with her father's acquiescence), overruled on other grounds sub nom.
Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983) (abolished spousal immunity).
28. Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 204
(1967).
29. Id.
30. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), overruled sub. nom. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642,
251 P.2d 149 (1952) (en banc). Commentators occasionally refer to the Hewellette, McKelvey,
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ceptance of the doctrine by analogizing parental immunity to the doctrine of
spousal immunity. 3 The Roller court propounded several other arguments
in favor of the doctrine as well.32 It maintained that recovery by one child
would deplete the familial assets available for its siblings.33 This, the court
stated, conflicted with a strong public policy demanding that a parent's es-
tate be equally available to all his or her children. 34 The court also sug-
gested that a tortfeasor parent might eventually inherit the recovery of a
successful child if the child predeceased the parent.35
B. The Doctrine of Parental Immunity in the District of Columbia
The District of Columbia first examined the doctrine of parental immu-
nity in 1948.36 In Villaret v. Villaret,37 a thirteen-year-old child brought suit
against his mother for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.38
Although the accident occurred in Maryland, the child sued in the United
and Roller opinions as the "great trilogy" of cases presenting the basic rationales behind the
parental immunity doctrine. Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family--Hus-
band & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 182 (1961).
31. 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789. The doctrine of spousal immunity prevents a husband
from suing a wife and vice versa due to the legal fiction that they constitute a single entity.
Hollister, supra note 1, at 496-97. However, common law did not treat parents and children
similarly, rather it legally recognized them as entirely separate individuals. See supra notes 16-
18 and accompanying text.
32. The Roller court could not rely upon the Hewellette family unity rationale because the
minor plaintiff sought to recover damages against her father for rape. 37 Wash. at 243, 79 P.
at 788. The daughter argued that the parental immunity doctrine did not apply to her case
because her father's actions irreparably destroyed the possibility of family unity. Id., 79 P. at
789. The court responded that the creation of an exception to the doctrine in this instance
would, in effect, open the floodgates on parental immunity and "allow an action to be brought
for any other [parental] tort." Id. at 244, 79 P. at 789.
33. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789. This rationale, labeled the "family exchequer" argument,
McCurdy, supra note 16, at 1073, ignores the fact, however, that parents may devise or bequest
their estates to their children in any proportion they desire and may even exclude their chil-
dren from inheritance entirely. In Roller, the trial court awarded the plaintiff minor a $2,000
judgment. 37 Wash. at 243, 79 P. at 788. This judgment was attached to the family home-
stead where the defendant and his other minor children resided, thereby lending weight to the
family exchequer argument in this instance. Id., 79 P. at 788.
34. Roller, 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
35. Id., 79 P. at 789. The court implied that this result would contravene the mandate
that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from his wrongful act. Id., 79 P. at 789.
36. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Although, subsequent to the Vil-
laret decision the issue of parental immunity arose several times in the federal courts in the
District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not have the opportunity
to address the parental immunity doctrine until 1985. See infra notes 113, 117, 134, and ac-
companying text.
37. 169 F.2d at 677.
38. Id.
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States District Court for the District of Columbia. 39 Therefore, on appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied
Maryland law and held the mother immune from suit despite the existence
of liability insurance.' The court noted that the District of Columbia had
never addressed the issue of parental immunity although the court recog-
nized that other jurisdictions had almost unanimously adopted the
doctrine.41
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia affirma-
tively adopted parental immunity in Dennis v. Walker.42 Dennis involved
the injury of a minor child while riding as a passenger in a car driven by his
mother.4' The child did not sue his mother, rather he sued the driver of the
second vehicle for negligence.' The defendant driver counterclaimed
against the minor's mother for contribution, alleging that her negligence had
contributed to the accident.45 In response, the mother stated that District of
Columbia law prohibited a defendant from seeking contribution from a joint
tortfeasor unless that tortfeasor could be held liable to the plaintiff as an
individual.46 The mother argued that the defendant could not claim contri-
bution from her because parental immunity precluded her own liability to
her child.47 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted the mother's motion for summary judgment.4' The court held that
the mother was immune from liability to her child and agreed that control-
ling case law precluded contribution unless the plaintiff could hold each joint
tortfeasor liable individually.49
The court justified its decision to adopt the parental immunity doctrine
with the traditional rationale that it preserved family unity.50 It acknowl-
edged the theory that the growing prevalence of liability insurance better
39. Id.
40. Id. at 678-79. The court stated that the existence of liability insurance did not justify
the creation of a new cause of action and warned that domestic disharmony and collusion
would likely result from suits predicated upon the presence of insurance. Id.
41. Id. at 678.
42. 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968).
43. Id. at 415. The car belonged to the child's father who was also riding as a passenger at
the time of the collision. Id.





48. Id. at 419.
49. Id. at 417-19. However, the court criticized this bar to contribution, because an "ex-
traneous principle of law" allowed one joint tortfeasor to escape liability, thereby unjustly
placing the entire burden of a plaintiff's recovery on only one joint tortfeasor. Id. at 418.
50. Id. at 417.
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protected the unity of the family but concluded that the presence of insur-
ance would also encourage collusion and fraud.51 In addition, the court ac-
corded deference to the fact that Maryland had adopted parental
immunity.52
A year after the Dennis decision, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia rendered a similar opinion in Emmert v. United
States. -3 The court applied Tennessee law under choice of law principles.
Emmert also concerned a defendant automobile driver's claim for contribu-
tion against the parent of a minor plaintiff.54 The adoption of the parental
immunity doctrine by Tennessee ultimately precluded contribution, but the
court expressed doubt over the soundness of the Dennis decision.55 It ques-
tioned the continued vitality of the parental immunity doctrine in the Dis-
trict of Columbia and announced that its viability was "tenuous at best" in
light of the recent trend towards abrogation of the doctrine.56
C. Exceptions to Parental Immunity
Largely in response to the rigidity of the parental immunity doctrine, judi-
cially created exceptions to parent-child immunity proliferated over the
years.57 Generally, courts fashioned exceptions to the doctrine "whenever
the family relationship no longer existed or had been 'temporarily aban-
51. Id. This is the rationale as first propounded by the court in Hewellette v. George, 68
Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
52. Dennis, 284 F. Supp. at 416. The court noted that the District of Columbia derives its
common law from Maryland, and therefore Maryland law deserves special scrutiny and con-
sideration. Id. The District of Columbia does not accord undue deference to Maryland law,
however, as evidenced by the fact that Maryland remains one of the few states which has
retained the parental immunity doctrine in almost its entirety. See Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542,
567, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (1986) (refusal to create an exception for automobile negligence cases);
Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1, 4, 403 A.2d 379, 381 (1979) (refusal to create an
exception for injuries inflicted during business activity). But see Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md.
61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951) (exception created for wanton and malicious conduct of
parent).
53. 300 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1969).
54. 300 F. Supp. at 47. In Emmert, the Emmert family car collided with a vehicle driven
by a United States employee. Id. Mrs. Emmert brought suit against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982), individually and on behalf of her two
daughters, for injuries they sustained in the accident. Emmert, 300 F. Supp. at 47. The
United States joined Mr. Emmert as a third-party defendant and presented a claim for contri-
bution against him. Id.
55. Emmert, 300 F. Supp. at 48, 51.
56. Id. at 48. The court construed choice of law principles as mandating Tennessee law as
the applicable law. Under § 390g of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS (Ten-
tative Draft No. 9, 1964), the law of a family's domicile determines potential immunity among
family members. The Emmerts resided in Tennessee, therefore, Tennessee law governed the
case.
57. Hollister, supra note 1, at 509.
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doned.' "58 Thus, a number of courts held the estate of a parent liable in
situations where the tortfeasor parent died59 or where a parent caused the
wrongful death of either the other parent' or the child.61 Many courts held
parents liable for intentional and malicious conduct because of the inappro-
priateness of such behavior in a familial setting.62 Some courts held parents
liable for grossly negligent conduct as well.63
Another recognized exception to parental immunity involved children
who were emancipated at the time the tort occurred. 6M Emancipation legally
terminates the parent-child relationship, therefore the relationship can no
longer serve as a basis for immunity.65 Courts also formulated exceptions to
58. Id.; see also Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. 1960) (parental immu-
nity applies only where a lawsuit would seriously disturb family unity).
59. See, e.g., Brennecke, 336 S.W.2d at 69 (mother killed in automobile accident in which
child injured); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 295, 176 A.2d 818, 818 (1962) (father
killed in automobile accident in which his two children were injured); Sisler v. Seeberger, 23
Wash. App. 612, 613, 596 P.2d 1362, 1363 (1979) (mother killed in automobile accident in
which killed one child and injured two other children).
60. Where a parent is responsible for the wrongful death of his or her child or the other
parent, the family relationship usually will be considered destroyed by the parent's wrongdo-
ing. See, e.g., Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 246, 330 A.2d 335, 344 (1974) (son permitted to
recover from father who was responsible for mother's death); Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252,
255, 130 S.E.2d 568, 569-70 (1963) (where mother killed as a result of father's reckless driving,
children allowed recovery as mother's beneficiaries). But see Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal.
App. 2d 536, 544, 295 P.2d 972, 978, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (children denied recovery
from stepfather whose negligence caused mother's death); Durham v. Durham, 227 Miss. 76,
85, 85 So. 2d 807, 809 (1956) (daughter unable to maintain wrongful death suit against father
for her mother's death).
61. See Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Ky. 1961) (child's estate enti-
tled to sue father for child's wrongful death); Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 324, 107
N.W.2d 531, 534 (1961) (daughter may recover from father's estate for the wrongful death of
her mother). But see Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1970) (mother barred from
suing father's estate for the wrongful death of their child); Hale v. Hale, 426 P.2d 681, 684
(Okla. 1967) (mother unable to maintain a wrongful death action against father for wrongful
death of child), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1370
(Okla. 1984) (parental immunity abrogated to extent of parent's liability insurance in automo-
bile negligence cases).
62. See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 427, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955) (willful miscon-
duct); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 727, 70 S.E.2d 152, 155 (1952) (willful and mali-
cious wrong); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951) (father's murder of
mother in child's presence constitutes malicious and willful conduct); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67
Wash. 2d 31, 37, 406 P.2d 323, 327 (1965) (driving while intoxicated is willful misconduct).
63. See Leggett v. Leggett, 216 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (driving while
intoxicated considered gross negligence).
64. See Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868, 873 (1955) (emanci-
pation amounts to a question of fact involving control of earnings and contribution to family
expenses); Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Supp. 125, 127, 110 A.2d 492, 493 (1954) (child must
allege emancipation in the complaint); Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 31, 94 S.E.2d 12, 13
(1956) (emancipation during a child's minority dependent upon parental agreement).
65. Comment, supra note 28, at 208.
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the doctrine where the child's injury occurred in the course of the parent's
business or vocational activity" or involved a person standing in loco paren-
tis to the child.67 The temporary abandonment of the parent-child relatibn-
ship again served as a justification for these exceptions to parental immunity.
Finally, a few courts suspended parental immunity in cases where a child
sued a parent for negligently causing an automobile accident, and the parent
carried liability insurance.68 This exception resulted from the fact that the
insurance payments relieved parents of financial responsibility for their
child's injuries and thus eliminated any threat to family harmony.69 In addi-
tion, courts ascribed significance to the fact that the act of driving an auto-
mobile involves a general responsibility to the public rather than an exercise
66. See Foy v. Foy Elec. Co., 231 N.C. 161, 161, 56 S.E.2d 418, 418 (1949) (child injured
by truck owned and operated by parents' business); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 566, 103
N.E.2d 743, 743 (1952) (child burned by gasoline fire at father's business). See generally San-
ford, Personal Torts Within The Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956).
67. See Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578, 579-80 (D. Vt. 1963) (stepfather could be
held liable for child injured while a passenger in automobile stepfather was driving); Cwik v.
Zylstra, 58 N.J. Super. 29, 32, 155 A.2d 277, 280 (1959) (grandmother liable for child injured
under her supervision). But see Bricault v. Deveau, 21 Conn. Supp. 486, 487, 157 A.2d 604,
605 (1960) (step-parent standing in loco parentis immune from liability to child). In some
instances where the negligent parent does not have custody of the injured child, courts have
held that parent-child immunity will not protect the parent. See Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386
So. 2d 705, 706 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (parents separated and negligent parent did not have
custody); Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. 1979) (child could maintain a wrongful
death suit against father for mother's death where parents divorced and mother retained
custody).
68. See Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976) (parents liable to extent of
automobile liability insurance policy); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1982) (parental
immunity considered waived to extent of parent's automobile liability insurance coverage);
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 365, 339 N.E.2d 907, 916 (1975) (child may recover to
limit of parent's insurance coverage in an automobile accident; court specifically limits aboli-
tion of parental immunity to facts of case); cf Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 202 Mont. 173,
180, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (1983) (parental immunity abrogated in all automobile negligence cases
regardless of insurance coverage). Many courts have expressly refused to consider liability
insurance as grounds for the creation of an exception to parent-child immunity or even as a
motivating factor. See Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank v. Heap, 128 Iil. App. 2d 165, 262 N.E.2d
826, 829 (1970) (insurance coverage not a factor in determining parental immunity); Baker v.
Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 458, 263 S.W.2d 29, 32 (1953) (parental immunity is unaffected by insur-
ance coverage), modified on other grounds sub nom. Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo.
1959). As illustrated above, the presence of liability insurance has served as a foundation for
arguments both for and against parental immunity. Proponents of the doctrine contend that
the availability of insurance encourages collusive and fraudulent suits among family members,
while opponents of the doctrine maintain that the award of insurance benefits protects the
family exchequer and promotes family harmony. Comment, supra note 28, at 217.
69. Although family unity may be strained where a parent is forced to make compensa-
tory payments to his or her child, see supra note 68 and cases cited therein, payments by an
insurance carrier alleviate any burden on the family budget or exchequer. See infra note 137
and accompanying text.
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of parental discretion.7 °
Similarly, the District of Columbia fashioned its own exceptions to the
parental immunity doctrine. In Dennis v. Walker,7' the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia expressly recognized exceptions to
parental immunity where the injuries resulted from willful or wanton paren-
tal conduct, the injuries occurred in the course of the parent's business activ-
ities, or the injuries were followed by the death of either the parent or the
child.72
In Perchell v. District of Columbia, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit created a fourth exception to parental
immunity. The Perchell case involved an automobile collision between
plaintiff Perchell and a District of Columbia police officer in which Perchell
and his two children sustained injuries. 74 The trial court determined that
Perchell was contributorily negligent, and the appellate court permitted the
District of Columbia to seek contribution from him.7 In doing so, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit accepted the position which the Dennis v. Walker
court advocated but felt constrained to reject: that contribution should be
available to prevent the inequity resulting from the placement of full respon-
sibility for a joint tort upon only one party.76 Although the court acknowl-
edged that permitting a defendant to claim contribution from a parent for a
child's injuries might interfere with domestic harmony, it concluded that the
preservation of domestic harmony did not justify the imposition of a new
inequity upon a third party.77
II. A NATIONAL TREND BEGINS TOWARD ABROGATION
OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY
In 1963, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first acted to substantially abro-
gate the parental immunity doctrine. 78 In Goller v. White,79 the highest
court of Wisconsin generally abolished parental immunity but held that the
70. See Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682, 684 (Del. 1979); Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177,
178-79, 191 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1971).
71. 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968).
72. Id. at 416.
73. 444 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74. Id. at 998 n. 1. Perchell subsequently brought an action against the District of Colum-
bia as the owner of the automobile and employer of the police officer. Id.
75. Id. at 999. The court in Perchell, disapproved of the holding reluctantly announced
by the federal district court in Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D.D.C. 1968), which
denied recovery of contribution from a contributorily negligent mother.
76. 284 F. Supp. 413, 418 (D.D.C. 1968).
77. Perchell, 444 F.2d at 998.
78. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
79. Id., 122 N.W.2d at 193. The Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded Goller to determine
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doctrine would continue to constitute a defense from liability where the neg-
ligent act involved an exercise of parental authority or parental discretion
over support or other care of the child.80 In reaching this decision, the court
noted the abundance of exceptions to parental immunity in various jurisdic-
tions.81 The court stated that the prevalence of liability insurance signifi-
cantly influenced its decision to abrogate the doctrine because insurance
coverage reduces the possibility of domestic disharmony. 2
Several courts soon followed the example set by Goller and abrogated the
parental immunity doctrine in whole or in part.8 3 Some jurisdictions cir-
cumscribed more narrowly the areas of parental conduct for which a parent
could be held liable. A few courts, for example, limited liability to automo-
bile negligence cases,8 4 while others abolished parental immunity only in
cases where the parent carried liability insurance.8 5 Morever, many of these
jurisdictions limited their invalidation of parental immunity to the specific
facts presented in the case before them. 6 Although they declined to pro-
nounce a general abolition of the doctrine, these courts by and large indi-
whether the foster parent defendant negligently operated a tractor in a manner causing injury
to his foster child. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
80. Id., 122 N.W.2d at 198. The subsequent Wisconsin case of Thoreson v. Milwaukee &
Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972), determined that "other care"
did not encompass daily living activities. Id. at 258, 201 N.W.2d at 753.
81. Goller, 20 Wis. 2d at 410-12, 122 N.W.2d at 197.
82. Id. at 412, 122 N.W.2d at 197.
83. See Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 89, 471 P.2d 282, 285 (1970) (approval of Goller
formulation of parental immunity abrogation); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky.
1970) (total abrogation of immunity except where exercise of parental authority or discretion);
Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639 (Me. 1979) (refusal to limit abrogation to automobile
accident cases or liability insurance cases); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436, 224 A.2d 588,
591 (1966) (total abrogation). Three jurisdictions statutorily abrogated the parental immunity
doctrine with regard to children injured by parents in motor vehicle accidents: Connecticut,
North Carolina, and South Carolina. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572c (Supp. 1987);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Cum. Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-210 (Law. Co-op.
1976). The South Carolina statute, however, was held unconstitutional in Elam v. Elam, 275
S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980), because it denied equal protection of the law to all parents.
Id. at 133-34, 268 S.E.2d at 110.
84. Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 186, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971) (abrogates parental
immunity in automobile negligence cases); Begley v. Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Co., 157
Conn. 445, 450 n.1, 254 A.2d 907, 910 n.1 (1969) (acknowledging statutory modification of
parental immunity regarding automobile negligence); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411,
416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980) (abolishes parental immunity in automobile negligence cases
leaving other areas of abolition to decision on a case-by-case basis).
85. See supra note 68 and cases cited therein.
86. See Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 365, 339 N.E.2d 907, 916 (1975) (limits
abolition to facts of case: child may recover to the limit of parent's insurance coverage in an
automobile negligence case); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893
(abolishes parental immunity in automobile negligence cases leaving other areas of abolition to
decision on a case-by-case basis); see also Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Wo-
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cated that they would proceed on a case-by-case basis and resolve new
parental immunity issues as they arose.
8 7
The American Law Institute also advocated a case-by-case approach in
section 895G of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. " The Restatement an-
nounced that the parent-child relationship itself will not form a basis for
immunity, but it recognized that certain acts and ommissions may remain
privileged due to the relationship. 9 Under comment k of section 895G, pa-
rental discipline is privileged, thus permitting a degree of physical contact
among family members which would be tortious among strangers.90 The
comment further observed that whether or not conduct arises directly from
the family relationship will affect a determination of negligence. 9' It also
suggested that a "reasonable prudent parent" standard is the proper test of
liability because it takes into consideration parental discretion over the care
and education of the child.92
At least three jurisdictions, New York, Illinois, and Arizona, premised
their abrogation of parental immunity upon the principle that a parent
should be held liable for a breach of duty owed to the public at large.93 In
the Illinois case of Cummings v. Jackson,94 the court held a mother liable for
man's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325,
342 n.106 (1984).
87. See supra note 86.
88. Parent and Child
(1) A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of
that relationship. (2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liabil-
ity for an act or omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise
privileged or is not tortious.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979). Oregon remains the only other jurisdic-
tion to adopt the Restatement position besides the District of Columbia. Winn v. Gilroy, 296
Or. 718, 731, 681 P.2d 776, 784 (1984).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979).
90. Id. § 895G comment k (1979). Comment k isolates parental discipline as the single
category of intentional tort which may constitute privileged behavior because of the parent-
child relationship. Id,
91. Id. Comment k states: "If the conduct giving rise to an injury does not grow directly
out of the family relationship, the existence of negligence may be determined as if the parties
were not related." The comment specifically mentions parental authority and supervision as
conduct it considers "essential" to the parent-child relationship. Id.
92. Id. In the Restatement's view, conduct must be "palpably unreasonable" in order to
impose liability upon a parent. Id. The Restatement also suggests that family members may
be able to draw an analogy to assumption of the risk in defense of their negligent torts. Id.
93. Sandoval v. Sandoval, 128 Ariz. 11, 13, 623 P.2d 800, 802 (1981); Cummings v. Jack-
son, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 70, 372 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (1978); Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35,
50-51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871-72 (1974). The jurisdictions which distin-
guish between familial and public duties must also determine exactly what duties a parent owes
its child.
94. 57 I11. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978).
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her daughter's injuries because they resulted from the mother's breach of a
general duty to the public." The mother failed to keep the trees on her
property properly trimmed, and consequently, they obstructed the view of a
motorist who struck the child.96 The court reasoned that the mother's viola-
tion of a city ordinance, which required property owners to trim their trees,
constituted a breach of duty to the general public.9 7
Conversely, these jurisdictions have extended immunity to parents who
negligently perform or fail to perform, a duty peculiar to the family relation-
ship." In Sandoval v. Sandoval,99 an Arizona court held that parental im-
munity protected parents of a child struck by an automobile because they
had left open a gate leading to the road.' °o The court deemed the parents'
failure to safeguard their child's play area to be a breach of the parental duty
to take "care and control" of their child and, therefore, held them immune
from liability.10'
New York has taken a further step in its duty analysis and has concluded
that a parent has no legal or public duty to supervise its child. 102 The New
York Court of Appeals reasoned that parents have only a moral obligation
to supervise their children. 10 3 The translation of this moral duty into a legal
one, the court stated, would circumscribe basic parental discretion and judg-
ment. " In New York, therefore, a parent has no public duty to supervise
his or her child and will not be held liable for negligent supervision.
California generally abolished parental immunity and now evaluates pa-
rental conduct in terms of traditional tort principles.'0° The Supreme Court
95. Id. at 70, 372 N.E.2d at 1128.
96. Id., 372 N.E.2d at 1128.
97. Id., 372 N.E.2d at 1128. The court could just as easily have concluded that the
mother breached a parental duty to supervise or control her child, thus protecting the mother
from liability.
98. See cases cited supra note 93.
99. 128 Ariz. 11, 623 P.2d 800 (1981).
100. Id. at 14, 623 P.2d at 802.
101. Id., 623 P.2d at 802.
102. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871-
72 (1974). New York initially abrogated parental immunity in Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23
N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1969).
103. Holodook, 36 N.Y.2d at 50-51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
104. Id, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871. For an extensive analysis and critical
discussion of the Holodook case, see Hollister, supra note 1, at 516-24. Hollister concludes that
the Holodook approach sacrifices both the child and third parties for the sake of the family
without adequate justification. Id. at 524. The court of appeals had also barred third parties
from seeking contribution from joint tortfeasor parents where the parents themselves could not
be held directly liable to the child. Holodook, 36 N.Y.2d at 51, 324 N.E.2d at 344, 364
N.Y.S.2d at 872.
105. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293
(1971).
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of California abolished the parental immunity doctrine in the case of Gibson
v. Gibson. 106 The court pronounced that a parent's liability will depend
upon the court's evaluation of whether the parent acted as any reasonable
and prudent parent would have acted in similar circumstances. 0 7 Thus, the
standard that California utilized consisted of the traditional measure of rea-
sonableness tempered by an acknowledgement of the inherent responsibili-
ties and privileges accompanying parenthood.' 8o The court afforded parents
discretion to care for and control their children, thereby enabling them to
take actions considered tortious outside of the context of the parent-child
relationship. "
The California Supreme Court expressly rejected the approach formulated
by Wisconsin in the Goller case, which grants general immunity to parental
conduct involving authority or discretion. "° The court maintained that
classifying certain conduct as either discretionary or negligent would inevita-
bly create arbitrary distinctions."I ' Furthermore, the court found "intolera-
ble" the proposition that a parent theoretically had "carte blanche to act
negligently toward his child" as long as his behavior could be categorized as
discretionary.' 12
III. ROUSEY v. ROUSEY. THE ABROGATION OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not examine the merits of
the parental immunity doctrine until 1985. In Rousey v. Rousey," 4 the
father of a minor alleged that the child's mother had negligently caused an
automobile accident in which the child was injured and therefore brought
106. Id. at 915-16, 479 P.2d at 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
107. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
108. Id., 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
109. Id., 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. For example, the court noted that parents
could not be held liable for battery if they "spanked" a disobedient child or for false imprison-
ment if they sent a child to its room. Id., 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
110. Id. at 921-22, 479 P.2d at 652-53, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. For a discussion of the Goller
case, see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
111. 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. The Supreme Court of Minne-
sota had employed the Goller formula for 12 years when it discarded it in favor of the Gibson
approach in Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980). The court found the
Goller exceptions too vague and subjective to apply equitably, while the "reasonable parent"
standard afforded flexibility and greater uniformity. Id. at 598-99; see also Nolecheck v. Gesu-
ale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 346, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1277, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340, 349 (1978) (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring) (approving reasonable parent standard).
112. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
113. Rousey v. Rousey, 499 A.2d 1199 (D.C. 1985), rev'd en banc, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C.
1987).
114. Id. at 1199.
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suit on the child's behalf.11 The trial court granted the mother summary
judgment, holding her immune from tort liability. 16 The court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case, declaring the parental immunity doctrine
obsolete and "declin[ing] to adopt it." '117
The court of appeals appeared to base its decision entirely upon the preva-
lence of liability insurance in modem society. 1 ' The court found that the
presence of insurance minimized any disruption of domestic tranquility by
relieving parents of direct financial responsibility for injuries suffered by
their children. 19 The insurance carrier, the court asserted, replaces the par-
ent as the real party in interest.1 20 The court conceded that the availability
of insurance benefits offered families a ready opportunity for collusion, but
declared that the possibility of collusion existed in every insurance case and
did not justify a "'blanket denial of recovery for all minors.' ,12 1 Further-
more, the court relied upon a Massachusetts opinion which concluded that
trial courts possess the ability to distinguish between fact and fiction and to
guard against collusive actions. 122 Thus, the court of appeals limited its abo-
lition of parental immunity to cases where the parent carries liability insur-
ance and announced that it would resolve other issues regarding parental
immunity as they arose. 1
23
Dissatisfied with the court of appeals' initial decision, the defendant
mother petitioned the court for a rehearing en banc. 124 The petition was
granted and the original opinion vacated. 125 The court of appeals, sitting en
115. Id. at 1200.
116. Id.
117. Id. The court announced that no prior controlling law existed on the issue because
the court was not bound by the United States district court's decision in Dennis v. Walker, 284
F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968). Rousey, 499 A.2d at 1202 n.6.
118. Rousey, 499 A.2d at 1202. The court largely attributed the trend towards abolition in
other jurisdictions to this same motivating factor. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. At least one judge has proposed that courts recognize insurance companies as the
real parties in interest in practice as well as in theory. Petersen v. City of Honolulu, 51 Haw.
484, 490, 462 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1969) (Abe, J., dissenting). His suggestion provides for the
retention of the parental immunity doctrine but permits minors to sue insurance companies
directly when their parents carry liability insurance. Id. at 491, 462 P.2d at 1010-11 (Abe, J.,
dissenting).
121. Rousey, 499 A.2d at 1202 (quoting Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 364, 339
N.E.2d 907, 915 (1975)). The court of appeals largely relied upon the reasoning presented in
Sorenson to support its holding. Id. Sorenson maintained that any damage to domestic har-
mony was inflicted when the tortious injury occurs-not when a child attempted to recover
damages for it. Sorenson, 369 Mass. at 360, 339 N.E.2d at 913-14.
122. Rousey, 499 A.2d at 1202.
123. Id. at 1202-03 & n.7.
124. Rousey v. Rousey, 507 A.2d 1046 (D.C. 1986).
125. Id.
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banc, broadened its original holding and abolished parental immunity in all
cases. 126 In doing so, the court adopted the position of section 895G of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which abrogates parent-child immunity but
recognizes that certain conduct will remain privileged because of the nature
of the parent-child relationship.' 27
Writing for the majority, Judge Terry presented an historical account of
the parental immunity doctrine and identified the traditional justifications
offered to support the doctrine: the preservation of family unity, the need
for parental discretion over discipline and control, and the analogy drawn to
interspousal immunity.' 2 He criticized the interspousal immunity analogy
and emphasized that the common law neither treated children as "mere ex-
tensions" of their parents nor considered children and their parents to con-
stitute a single legal entity, as it did with husband and wife.' 29
Although Judge Terry thoroughly discredited the interspousal immunity
analogy, he only briefly mentioned the two more significant rationales to the
parental immunity doctrine: family harmony and parental discipline and
control. He merely observed that these rationales are absurd in cases involv-
ing intentional torts and in cases where the parent-child relationship has
been terminated by death.' 3" Judge Terry did note that the District of Co-
lumbia legislature rejected the family unity rationale with regard to inter-
spousal immunity when it statutorily abolished interspousal immunity in
1976.'13
The majority opinion addressed District of Columbia prior law by discuss-
126. Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 420-21 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). The court declined to
adopt the parental immunity doctrine. Id. at 416. Although the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals had never explicitly adopted parental immunity, the local federal courts followed the
doctrine in practice. See infra note 134; see also infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
127. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 416; see supra note 88.
128. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 417-18.
129. Id. Judge Terry also questioned the rationale behind permitting children to sue their
parents in property and contract actions while barring them from instituting tort actions
against their parents. Id. at 418.
130. Id. Judge Terry stated: "When a wrong has been committed between parent and
child, 'the harm to the family relationship has already occurred; and to prohibit reparations
can hardly aid in restoring harmony.' " Id. at 421 (quoting Petersen v. City of Honolulu, 51
Haw. 484, 488, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1969)). This reasoning, based upon the destruction of, or
significant harm to, the family relationship, fails to provide an adequate explanation for the
abolition of parental immunity in cases of simple negligence where family harmony remains
intact. See id. at 422 (Nebeker, J., dissenting). Thus, the majority opinion places greater em-
phasis on the fact that a national trend towards the abrogation of parental immunity exists,
rather than upon the weaknesses of its doctrinal foundations.
131. Id. at 417 n.l.
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ing the Villaret'32 and Dennis.33 cases although it found that there was no
controlling precedent on the issue of parental immunity in the District of
Columbia.' 34 Although Judge Terry extensively quoted language from the
Dennis opinion expressing concern about the possibility of collusion where
the parent carried liability insurance, he failed to acknowledge that the Den-
nis case ultimately adopted and applied the parental immunity doctrine.'
35
As in the initial Rousey hearing, the court of appeals' rationale in the en
banc hearing relied heavily upon the prevalence of liability insurance.' 36
Judge Terry noted that the availability of insurance benefits lessens the likeli-
hood of domestic tension.' 37  Quoting from other opinions, he maintained
that the possibility of collusion alone did not justify the universal denial of
recovery.' 31 Although Judge Terry considered widespread insurance cover-
age to be a strong impetus for abolition, he refused to limit his holding to
cases where the parent carried liability insurance, nor would he limit recov-
132. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); see also supra notes 36-41 and
accompanying text (discussing facts and law).
133. Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); see also supra notes 42-52 and
accompanying text (discussing facts and law).
134. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 418-19. The District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of
1970, D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-102 (1981), installed the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
as the highest court in the District of Columbia. After the effective date of February 1, 1971,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals need no longer treat decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as precedent. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285
A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). As a "matter of internal policy," however, decisions announced by
the District of Columbia Circuit before the effective date must be followed by any division of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. Only when the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals sits en banc can the court refuse to follow the District of Columbia Circuit's decisions.
Id. The decision in Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968), adopting parental
immunity, dates prior to 1971, but because it was decided by the United States district court
rather than the circuit court, it is not controlling upon the court of appeals. Perchell v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1971), implicitly recognizing the viability of the
parental immunity doctrine, was a District of Columbia Circuit decision but was decided in
May 1971. Id. at 997. Thus, the Rousey decision was technically correct in stating that no
controlling precedent existed on the issue of parental immunity in the District of Columbia.
Rousey, 528 A.2d at 418-19.
135. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 419.
136. Id. at 420.
137. Id. Judge Terry stated that the insurance payments decreased the likelihood that law-
suits against parents would disrupt family harmony because these payments relieved the par-
ents of direct financial responsibility for their actions. Id. However, he failed to address the
possibility that insurance companies would react to the abrogation of parental immunity by
curtailing the availability of insurance for parental torts. See infra text accompanying note
143.
138. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 420. Judge Terry quoted approvingly language from the Soren-
son opinion which declares that the risk of collusion accompanies all litigation and is ade-
quately minimized by the fact-finding process. Id. (quoting Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass.
350, 365, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914-15 (1975)).
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ery to the amount of the insurance policy.' 39 In support of the majority
position, Judge Terry simply declared that the formulation of different rules
for the insured and the uninsured was unjustified. 4 ° Therefore, the court
failed to reconcile the significant role liability insurance played in its decision
to abolish parental immunity with its ultimate holding that the presence of
insurance is immaterial to liability.
In the first of two dissenting opinions, Judge Nebeker emphasized that he
believed the majority was misguided in relying upon the widespread exist-
ence of liability insurance as justification for its abrogation of parental im-
munity. 141 He commented that basing a new form of tort liability upon the
availability of insurance constituted "imprudent public policy."' 4 2 Judge
Nebeker further predicted that insurance companies would inevitably re-
spond by raising premiums or cancelling coverage for parental torts.
14 3
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Nebeker also pointed out that a case-by-
case approach to abolition presented numerous problems due to the uncer-
tainty of its consequences.'" Given the absence of any parameters for liabil-
ity, Judge Nebeker queried whether children could recover for parental
failure to seek medical treatment, failure to provide a special education, or
the failure to abort a fetus with foreseeable birth defects.' 45
Finally, Judge Nebeker argued that the majority holding would disturb
familial tranquility and "disparage the wisdom of the past which champi-
oned the family unit, as if a contrary modem view is obviously superior."'1
46
He contended that it would be difficult to subject parental discretion over
child-rearing to a uniform standard. 47 Judge Nebeker concluded that the
abolition of parental immunity would force parents to sue one another, often
139. Id. at 421.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 422-23 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 422 (Nebeker, J., dissenting). Judge Nebeker stated: "The theory of insurance
is that it is supposed to give financial protection against the occurence of a known risk. Once a
type of insurance exists, it is not supposed to encourage the creation of new actions at law."
Id. (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 423 (Nebeker, J., dissenting). Once this occurred, Judge Nebeker submitted, the
majority's primary rationale for the abolition of parental immunity would be effectively nulli-
fied. Id. (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 421 (Nebeker, J., dissenting). Without stating his reasons why, Judge Nebeker
disagreed with the majority's suggestion that the availability of insurance would alleviate do-
mestic tension created by "offspring suits" by relieving parents of financial responsibility for
their child's recovery. Id. at 422 (Nebeker, J., dissenting). The judge further contended that
the presence of insurance would, instead, foster fraudulent actions. Id. (Nebeker, J.,
dissenting).
147. Id. at 423 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
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recovering damages on behalf of one child while depleting the resources
available for other siblings.
14 8
Judge Belson wrote the second dissenting opinion'49 and primarily chal-
lenged the majority's characterization of District of Columbia prior law as
inconclusive.' 5° The judge observed' 5 ' that the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia actively applied the doctrine of parental immu-
nity in Dennis v. Walker, 152 and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, by modifying the doctrine's scope, implicitly
recognized it in Perchell v. District of Columbia.'53 Judge Belson regarded
the majority's departure from an established judicial doctrine as an impru-
dent excursion into the realm of public policy.'" 4 He maintained that the
abrogation of parental immunity presented strong public policy considera-
tions which the legislature was better equipped to handle.'
55
IV. THE FUTURE OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA: A PIECEMEAL APPROACH
The traditional doctrine of parental immunity has indeed become out-
dated and obsolete. As a matter of public policy, parents should not be per-
mitted to act negligently towards their children without fear of liability. It is
well established, however, that society must accord a parent a greater degree
of discretion and control over his relationship with his child than would be
warranted over his other personal and business relationships. Therefore, a
balance must be struck between a child's right to recover for personal inju-
ries negligently inflicted and a parent's right to rely upon his own judgment
in raising a child.
Basically five different jurisdictional approaches exist to the abrogation of
the parental immunity doctrine: 1) partial abolition in cases where the par-
148. Id. at 423-24 (Nebeker, J., dissenting). One parent must sue another on behalf of the
child because a child younger than 18 is considered to be under a disability and, therefore, does
not have the legal capacity to sue on his or her own behalf. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-302(a)(1)
(1981). In light of this statutory bar to the maintenance of a lawsuit by a child, Judge Nebeker
questioned whether the court's ruling might now permit the liability of a parent for failing to
sue his spouse on his child's behalf. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 423 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
149. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 424 (Belson, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Pryor joined in Judge
Belson's dissent. Id. (Belson, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Belson, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Belson, J., dissenting).
152. Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413, 416-17 (D.D.C. 1968).
153. Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F.2d 997, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
154. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 424-25 (Belson, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Belson, J., dissenting). Judge Belson specified "the potential for collusive law-
suits, divisiveness in family structures, and the need to compensate tort victims" as factors the
District of Columbia council might properly contemplate. Id. (Belson, J., dissenting).
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ent has liability insurance coverage;'5 6 2) partial abolition in cases where the
parent has breached a public duty, as followed by New York, Illinois, and
Arizona; 15 7 3) general abolition with the exception of cases involving an ex-
ercise of ordinary parental authority or discretion, or the Goller approach; 5
4) general abolition with parental privileges determined on a case-by-case
basis as set out by section 895G of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,'59 and
5) general abolition with liability tested by the reasonable parent standard,
or the California approach.' 6
The least tenable of these five approaches is the abolition of parental im-
munity only in cases where there is liability insurance. The creation of a
new area of tort liability solely because the intended defendants carry liabil-
ity insurance has received sound criticism as an imprudent method of fash-
ioning public policy.' 6 ' The purpose of insurance coverage is to guard
against known risks, it is not intended to encourage the creation of a new
form of liability.162 Moreover, insurance companies may react by eliminat-
ing or restricting parental coverage, thereby nullifying the intended effect of
this narrow abolition of parental immunity.
163
The Goller formula of retaining parental immunity where the parent's
conduct involved an exercise of "ordinary" parental authority or discretion
has received justified criticism by commentators and courts because it inevi-
tably draws a vague and somewhat arbitrary line between cases. 64 Wiscon-
sin, for example, interprets "parental authority" as limited to parental
discipline, while in Michigan the term also includes the negligent supervision
of a child. 165 Therefore, parents held liable for negligent supervision in Wis-
consin would be immune from liability for the same conduct in Michigan
although both states have ostensibly adopted identical approaches.
The public versus parental duty approach adopted by New York, Ari-
zona, and Illinois draws criticism for the same reasons as the Goller ap-
156. A corollary to this approach is the abrogation of parental immunity in all automobile
negligence cases, regardless of insurance coverage. See supra note 68.
157. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
158. The Wisconsin approach formulated in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d
193 (1963).
159. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
160. The California approach formulated in Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648,
92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc).
161. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Hollister, supra note 1, at 513-14; see also Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 914, 479 P.2d at 648, 92
Cal. Rptr. at 288; Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 203-04, 610 P.2d 560, 563 (1980); Ander-
son v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. 1980).
165. Hollister, supra note 1, at 514.
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proach. The distinction between public and parental duties is often blurred
and contradictory.' 6 6 Therefore, the distinction between liability and immu-
nity is likewise arbitrary and inconsistent.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has chosen the approach to-
wards abolition of parental immunity articulated by section 895G of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. 167 The Restatement's position attempts to
coordinate the complete abolition of parental immunity with the acknowl-
edgement that certain parental conduct must remain "privileged" because of
the nature of the parent-child relationship. '6 8 However, by failing to specify
exactly what conduct it considers privileged, the Restatement leaves a con-
tinuing puzzle for future cases to resolve.
Rather than providing a workable solution, this approach creates further
problems because it places the court of appeals in the same position that
other jurisdictions are struggling to abandon. Most courts announced a gen-
eral rule of parental immunity and gradually eroded the viability of that rule
by the judicial creation of exceptions to it.' 69 The District of Columbia, on
the other hand, has created a general rule of parental liability and intends to
immunize "privileged" conduct on a case-by-case basis, thereby initiating a
similar process of erosion. Such an approach leaves open the possibility that
the exceptions to parental liability will proliferate to such an extent that the
utility of fashioning a general rule becomes dubious.
Alternatively, the California approach provides a single test for parental
conduct.' 70  The use of a reasonable parent standard affords a uniform
method to determine the propriety of holding a parent responsible to his
child for negligence.' 7 ' At the same time, it avoids the unpredictability and
uncertainty of the case-by-case approach announced by section 895G of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and now followed by the District of
Columbia. 1 
2
Although the reasonable parent approach has earned almost universal ac-
ademic approval, is has drawn judicial criticism.' 73 For example, Idaho has
166. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
173. Beal, supra note 86, at 353-54. The Supreme Court of Oregon offered another criti-
cism of the California approach in Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 730, 681 P.2d 776, 783 (1984).
The court claimed that the reasonable parent standard precludes the development of judicial
boundaries to govern parental conduct and, therefore, forces each case to trial. Id., 681 P.2d
at 783. This reasoning is unpersuasive, however, as case law itself will set precedent and will
alert potential plaintiffs to the likelihood of success or failure before litigation ensues. The
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expressly rejected the reasonable parent standard.1 74 This state's supreme
court challenged that it would be impossible and impractical to adopt a sin-
gle standard for its citizens because of the "diversity in [their] religious, eth-
nic and cultural backgrounds." ' 75 The court maintained that an objective
standard would infringe upon the freedom of parental choice to determine
the proper upbringing for a child in light of a family's socio-economic, edu-
cational and geographic circumstances, and the opportunities they
afforded. 1
76
This argument ignores, however, the fact that a reasonable person stan-
dard is applied to all defendants who come before the courts in tort actions.
These defendants represent a multitude of social, economic, racial, and reli-
gious groups, yet all are held to one standard of reasonableness. Moreover, a
defendant parent will only be held to a standard of reasonableness relative to
the behavior of similarly situated parents. Furthermore, juries may easily be
instructed to take into Consideration the many variables such as background,
education, and wealth, which will necessarily differ with each parent.
V. CONCLUSION
In Rousey v. Rousey the District of Columbia has wisely decided to abolish
the doctrine of parental immunity. The court would have been better ad-
vised, however, to adopt a reasonable parent standard of liability applicable
to all cases rather than labor to develop parental privileges on a case-by-case
basis. The course the court has chosen requires the accommodation of com-
Gilroy court went on to adopt the position of § 895G of the Restatement (Second) of Torts on
the abolition of parental immunity. 296 Or. at 734, 681 P.2d at 785. This is surprising in light
of the court's criticism of the California approach because the Restatement's position requires
that parental privileges be determined on a case-by-case basis. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 895G (1979).
174. Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (1980). The court ulti-
mately held that negligent supervision would not constitute a cause of action against parents,
but stated that parental immunity was no longer an absolute bar to parental liability. Id., 610
P.2d at 564.
175. Id., 610 P.2d at 564.
176. Id., 610 P.2d at 564. Another critic has proposed that the employment of a reason-
able parent standard would "necessarily substitute parental judgments based upon the individ-
ual juror's views of proper or ideal child-rearing practices." Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d
595, 602 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting); see also Pedigo, 101 Idaho at 205, 610 P.2d
at 564 ("The people of Idaho are too diverse and independent to be judged by a common
standard in such a delicate area as the parent-child relationship."). Anderson also suggests that
collusion is possible where a parent is asked to testify regarding the reasonableness of the
principles and practices by which he raises his child. 295 N.W.2d at 602. These two argu-
ments, however, disregard the fact that the dangers they suggest specifically arise when a rea-
sonable parent standard is applied, are dangers inherent in all litigation because of the nature
of the trial process itself. See Pedigo, 101 Idaho at 203, 610 P.2d at 562 ("As in any other tort
action, judges and juries can be relied upon to ferret out fraudulent and collusive claims.").
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peting public policy considerations to determine which behavior constitutes
privileged parental conduct. In addition, the court will undoubtedly be con-
fronted with numerous "test" cases because the boundaries of parental
"privilege" have been left uncharted.1 77 The reasonable parent standard by-
passes these complications by providing a single measure of liability with
which both courts and juries have long been familiar. In Rousey v. Rousey
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has taken the leap and abolished
parental immunity. The stability of the ground upon which it now stands
remains to be seen.
Carla Maria Marcolin
177. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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